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dŚĞhŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐƐŽĨ/ŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ1 
sŝŬƚŽƌƂƌĨůĞƌ ?DĂƌĐ^ƚŝĞƌĂŶĚ 
 ?dŚĞŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞŵŝŶĚŝƐĂƐĂĐƌĞĚŐŝĨƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶal mind is a faithful servant. 
tĞŚĂǀĞĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƚŚĂƚŚŽŶŽƌƐƚŚĞƐĞƌǀĂŶƚĂŶĚŚĂƐĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶƚŚĞŐŝĨƚ ? ?
Albert Einstein 
Understanding intuition puzzled many researchers.  Only philosophers were feeling 
comfortable to think about intuition not only as a legitimate but also as a possibly superior 
form of knowledge (see e.g. Bergson, 1911, 1946; Jung, 1921: §770; Spinoza, 1677: Part 5).  It 
was thus during this early stage of intuition research, that philosophy provided the basis for 
one of the most fundamental claims in the human studies: if we were to fully understand 
human consciousness, we must also understand intuition.  In fact, as David Chalmers (1998: 
110) ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ? ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ǀĞƌǇ ƌĂŝƐŽŶ Ě ?ġƚƌĞ ?why we know so little about human 
consciousness.  Thus, psychologists started to develop ƚŚĞƐŽĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ĚƵĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ? 
that later also found recognition within management and organization research.  Although 
intuition has thus found its way into mainstream research, we cannot say that we have a 
widespread agreement about some fundamentals of intuition, i.e. whether it can be 
ultimately reduced to firings of neurons, should it be regarded as a complex mental 
phenomenon, or whether we should regard it as something mystical.  Of course, in this 
intuition is not fundamentally different from other mental phenomena, only due to its 
peculiar characteristics discussed below, the possibility of looking at it in different lights is 
more apparent.  However, we believe that this lack of agreement will not prevent scholarly 
attempts to understand intuition better.  And, for now at least, researchers with very different 
                                                     
1 dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ?ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚŵĂŶƵƐĐƌŝƉƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐbook chapter; please use this reference: 
Dörfler, Viktor & Stierand, Marc (2017) The Underpinnings of Intuition, Liebowitz, Jay, Paliszkiewicz, Joanna & 
'ŽųƵĐŚŽǁƐŬŝ ?:ĞƌǌǇ ?ĚƐ ? ?/ŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ?dƌƵƐƚ ?ĂŶĚŶĂůǇƚŝĐƐ ?dĂǇůŽƌ ?&ƌĂŶĐŝƐ ?ŽĐĂZĂƚŽŶ ?&> ? ?-20.
(https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=5lQ7DwAAQBAJ) 
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ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ƐĞĞŵ ƚŽ ďĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ďƵŝůĚ ŽŶ ŽŶĞ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĂŶĚ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ũŽŝŶƚ
endeavor to catch the essence of this particularly interesting and beautiful mental 
phenomenon. 
Although intuition as a valuable tool used by managers, particularly top executives, for making 
good decisions, seemed reasonable, it was not before Chester Barnard (1938) published his 
seminal book  ‘dŚĞ &ƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ? that exploring intuition started.  Although 
Chester Barnard was a practitioner himself, his book has been widely accepted in academe, 
and in the field of intuition it marks the beginning of the scholarly interest in intuition.  The 
first academic inquiry to allow for including intuition was HeƌďĞƌƚ ^ŝŵŽŶ ?Ɛ work on 
 ‘ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ ĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ ?(first edition published 1947) that led to one of the most cited 
descriptions of intuition:  “/ŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ  W at least good judgment  W are simply 
ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐĨƌŽǌĞŶŝŶƚŽŚĂďŝƚ ?(Simon, 1987: 63).  This was followed by the study by Weston Agor 
(1986) ? ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŽŶ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?intuition, in which he explored both 
successes and failures  W this has a symbolic value, as it shows that those who argue for the 
importance of intuition are not necessarily blind to the failures of intuition. 
In this chapter, we portray intuition in the context of decision making by combining 
understandings from a variety of areas and drawing on both practitioner as well as academic 
sources.  We limit, for the sake of understanding, intuition to consist of intuitive knowledge 
that is often accompanied by somatic and affective charges, thus ignoring the multi-potential 
aspect of intuition and more generally of cognition (see e.g. Dörfler & Szendrey, 2008).  We 
establish a link between intuition and different levels of expertise, but essentially focus on 
intuition at the highest level of expertise.   
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What is intuition? 
 ?/ŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶŝƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞĂůůǇ ?ŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? ?
John Kord Lagemann 
Perhaps the easiest way to conceptualize intuiting is to see it ĂƐĂǁĂǇŽĨ ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚŬŶŽǁŝŶŐ ?,
that is, knowing  “without any use of conscious reasoning ?(Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005: 357).  
Although this is certainly not an all-encompassing explanation, most people seem to 
understand it intuitively, and thus we adopt it as our starting point.  Direct knowing means 
that knowledge is not achieved by the step-by-step reasoning that typically characterizes the 
academic view of decision making but through a process that somehow seems to bypass these 
steps.  Usually, when a concept is so vague, such as intuition at this point, we often contrast 
it with something, i.e. explain it through what it is not.  Thus, intuition is often contrasted with 
analysis or with rational methods.  However, none of these contrasts seem to stand scrutiny.  
The opposite of analysis is not intuition but synthesis.  It is true that intuition often entails 
synthesis, and this is the point where Mintzberg (1994) challenged Simon on his 
conceptualization of intuition as being  ‘ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ĨƌŽǌĞŶ ŝŶƚŽŚĂďŝƚ ?, arguing that intuition is 
about synthesis, which you will never achieve through analyses.  Yet, synthesis can also be 
achieved through step-by-step reasoning, not only by means of intuiting.  Similarly, intuition 
sometimes seems simply to bypass the analytical steps, without necessarily providing 
synthesis.  However, unless we understand what happens when we intuit, we cannot be sure 
that there was no synthesis involved in the process of bypassing the steps of the analysis.  It 
is also possible that bypassing the analytical steps happens by synthesizing these steps.  As 
we will show later, rationality also cannot be contrasted to intuition; on the one hand the 
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞ ŽĨ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ ?  ‘ƌĂƚŝŽ ? ŵĞĂŶƐ ŵŝŶĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽ
anything that comes from the mind is by definition rational.  Furthermore, we also know 
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about many different forms of rationality, and some of tŚĞƐĞ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ^ŝŵŽŶ ?Ɛ  ‘ďŽƵŶĚĞĚ
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ůĞĂǀĞĂŵƉůĞƐƉĂĐĞĨŽƌŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶƚŚĞĚƵĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ
labelled parallel in contrast with the sequential mode of reasoning but what we really know 
is that intuition is non-sequentiaů ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞĂůůǇŬŶŽǁǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐƉĂƌĂůůĞůŽƌŶŽƚ ?ĂŶŝĞů
<ĂŚŶĞŵĂŶ ?Ɛ(2011) recent work on fast and slow thinking seems to be to the point, although 
there are other ways of fast thinking beyond intuition, such as guessing.  It seems that we 
have not much else to go on than to talk about intuitive vs. non-intuitive reasoning. 
We distinguish between two kinds of intuition, these can be conceptualized as  ?ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ? and  ?/ŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚ ? (see detailed argument in Dörfler & Ackermann, 2012; 
Stierand & Dörfler, 2016).  Intuitive judgment is what we primarily associate with decision 
making, more precisely, with a particular step in the decision making process, usually called 
choice or decision taking, which is concerned with the evaluation of the decision 
alternative(s).  Intuitive insight is, conversely, the intuition of the creatives, it is getting us to 
a solution to a(n ill-structured) problem.  It is important that it is about a solution rather than 
the solution, as a variety of new solutions can be created.  However, intuitive insight may also 
appear in the decision making process, only it is not associated with the decision taking phase 
but rather with creation (often mistakenly referred to as generation) of decision alternatives.  
However, in what follows, we primarily focus on intuitive judgment. 
We also want to emphasize that we do not argue for an exclusive use of intuition.  What we 
expect to see in decision making, is a cycle of intuitive and non-intuitive steps, pretty much 
as described by Bergson (1911, 1946).  Decision makers usually follow non-intuitive reasoning 
as long as they can, i.e. as long as there is more information to gather and more time to gather 
it, however, when time is pressing and when information is scarce, decision takers use 
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intuitive judgment.  Then they need to get into a non-intuitive mode again, to develop an 
explanation that justifies their intuitive judgment.  The process is similar in the case of 
creativity, for example when creating decision alternatives (see more details in Dörfler & 
Eden, 2014).  It is important that the non-intuitive explanation always follows a flash of 
intuition and, although it often provides a meaningful explanation or even justification for the 
intuitive outcome, it may or may not have anything to do with what happened in the process 
of intuiting.  Recognizing the cycles of intuition and non-intuition gains further importance 
when we consider that for a long time it was assumed that intuitive and non-intuitive 
reasoning are on the opposite ends of a single dimension and consequently the same person 
could only be good at one of these.  More recent research (Hodgkinson et al., 2009), however, 
suggests that these are two different dimensions.  Thus we argue that for good decision 
making we need good intuition as well as good non-intuition.  The intuitive and the non-
intuitive minds are friends not foes. 
Expert intuition 
 ? ? ? ?ǁŝƚŚƚĂůĞŶƚĂŶĚĂŐƌĞĂƚĚĞĂůŽĨŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐŝŶƚŽĂŶ
expert who intuitively sees what to do without recourse to rules nor to remembered cases. 
Hubert Dreyfus 
Our own interest in intuition stems from a workshop in which one of us was involved with the 
board of executives of a large telecom company.  As the importance of knowledge came up, 
ŝƚďĞĐĂŵĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďŽĂƌĚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽŶůǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ‘ƚĞǆƚďŽŽŬ ?-type knowledge, so we 
drew a quick schematic diagram about positioning intuition as a separate knowledge type 
(Dörfler et al., 2011).  While they quickly understood intuition as condensed expertise (Weick, 
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1995: 88), it was less easy to explain that it is not simply about experience, as experience does 
not automatically convert to expertise.  In the words of Klein and Weick (2000: 19): 
 ?dŚĞŽŶůǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƐƐĂŐĞŽĨƚŝŵĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƐŝƐƚŽŵŽǀĞǇŽƵĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽƌĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚŽƌ
termination.  Too often, we treat experience as a noun rather than as a verb, something 
ƚŽĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚĞ ? ?
Hence, experience is indispensable but not sufficient for becoming an expert.  What matters 
most is what we do with that experience  W we need to learn from it in order to develop 
expertise.  In line with Dane and Pratt (2009), we see expertise as a precursor to trustworthy 
intuition; this view in the literature is emphasized by terms, such as  ‘ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ-as-ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?
(Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004) ?  ‘ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?(Kahneman & Klein, 2009) Žƌ  ‘ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ-
ďĂƐĞĚŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ?(Salas, Rosen & DiazGranados, 2010). 
The notion of expertise can also explain much of the disagreement in the management and 
organization studies field about the usefulness of intuition.  If we take a closer look at those 
studies that claim to have provided experimental evidence on the failure of intuition 
(including Bowers et al., 1990: 97; Schoemaker & Russo, 1993: 27; Trailer & Morgan, 2004), 
we will usually find experiments targeted at intuitions of novices.  Remarkably, we did not 
find a single instance where this was not the case.  These experiments are typically, but not 
exclusively, conducted with students; for instance, Trailer and Morgan (2004) observed that 
undergraduate business school students make poor intuitive judgements in the field of 
physics.  But, why would business school students have intuition in physics?  In contrast, those 
who have found empirical (usually not gained through experiments) evidence of intuition 
working well in their respective fields of interest (including Burke & Miller, 1999 in 
management; Hayashi, 2001 in leadership; Keren, 1987 in the game of bridge), typically 
 7 
focused on intuition at high level of expertise.  Due to the relatively small number of studies 
providing empirical, and particularly experimental, evidence about intuition in management, 
our argument is not conclusive but we find it intuitively convincing. 
The significance of expertise for intuition can also be approached from the opposite end, from 
the development of expertise.  There are three key models, developed using very different 
methodological approaches, that explain levels of expertise.  The first was originally put 
forward by Simon and his various collaborators (e.g. Chase & Simon, 1973a; Chase & Simon, 
1973b; Gobet & Simon, 1996a, 1996b, 2000), using an experimental approach.  Then, the 
Dreyfus brothers developed their model using phenomenology (e.g. Dreyfus, 2004; Dreyfus 
& Dreyfus, 1986; Kreisler & Dreyfus, 2005).  And, finally, Dörfler et al (2009) presented a 
purely speculative model of expertise levels.  Whilst these models have been developed using 
different methods, they are complementary and have a common touchpoint in 
acknowledging that intuiting becomes the dominant mode of knowing at the highest level of 
expertise. 
Currently, there seems to be considerable agreement that intuition works well only at a high 
level of expertise (cf. Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Prietula & Simon, 1989; Salas, 
Rosen & DiazGranados, 2010).  Daniel Kahneman, who pointed out numerous flaws of 
intuition, always deliberately focused on commonsense-level intuition, and criticized those 
painting a positive picture of intuition for not emphasizing that it is only intuition at high level 
of expertise that works well  W the intuition of experts he also finds useful. 
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The process of intuiting 
 ?Intuition is not something that is given.  / ?ǀĞƚƌĂŝŶĞĚŵǇŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ
accept as obvious shapes which were initially rejected as absurd  ? ? ? ? 
Benoit Mandelbrot 
We do not exactly know what happens when we intuit, for  “ŵƵĐŚĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƌĞƐƚƐ
ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ŽŶ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ? ƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŝǀĞ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ƚŚĞŽƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?(Sadler-Smith, 
2016).  Little empirical research has been done to date, only a fraction of this is qualitative, 
and only a small part of that focuses on the subjective experience of intuiting.  Therefore, 
what we present here is how we speculate about what happens when we intuit, using 
WŽůĄŶǇŝ ?Ɛ(1962, 1966a, 1966b) work as our starting point (see Dörfler & Ackermann, 2012). 
WŽůĄŶǇŝ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůargument is concerned with tacit knowing more generally, but it also works 
for intuiting.  Let us consider exploring a room with a stick with our eyes closed.  Initially, we 
would be paying attention to what we feel in our fingers, such as the vibrations of the stick, 
the angle under which it is inclined, changes of direction, etc.  These feelings are the 
particulars in the process of tacit knowing, they take place on the near end of the stick 
(proximal term), and they belong to the realm of subsidiary knowing.  If we continue exploring 
the room a little longer, we will soon start picturing the room at the far end of the stick (distal 
term).  Thus, our attention turns from the particulars to the whole, to the picture of the room 
that is still forming in our mind, and this whole is what we focus on, thus we label it as focal 
knowing.  The process of tacit knowing is then an integration process, in which the particulars 
are integrated into the whole and the particulars seem to be dissolved in this process.  Initially 
some particulars will probably belong to the tacit realm, others to the explicit, but the 
integration process is tacit, and as soon as the focal whole emerges, we lose awareness of the 
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particulars.  We cannot tell anymore about the feeling in our palm, we can only tell how we 
picture the room. 
 
Adapted from Dörfler and Ackermann (2012: 554) 
Figure 1: The process of intuiting 
The above example was perhaps not what immediately comes to mind when thinking of 
intuition, but has the advantage of having the particulars and the whole on the two different 
ends of the stick and thus we find it useful to start with.  However, recognizing a face or 
writing a poem can be described in a very similar way.  We could tell some characteristics of 
a face we recognize, before the actual recognition happens, and we can know the rules of 
grammar, letters, etc. when writing a poem.  However, when we are actually in the process 
of recognizing the face or writing the poem, we will have no idea which facial characteristics 
we have seen when the recognition took place or which rules of grammar we have used when 
the poem was written.  What is really interesting is that if we describe the facial characteristics 
of someone we have not seen for many years, we will recognize the face even if the 
characteristics we described beforehand have changed; we may not even notice that those 
characteristics have changed.  Hence, we frequently ĚŽŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐǁĞƵƐĞ
to recognize the focal whole. 
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Although some would perhaps question whether recognizing a face or writing a poem 
qualifies for intuition, the process of intuiting works the same way in the case of intuitive 
judgments as well.  The particulars would include our explicit expectations and the 
information we have about the decision alternatives but can also include things we may have 
no idea about, such as a move or a look of our negotiating partner.  When we make the choice, 
we will not know what particulars we used.  If we come up with an ex post explanation, that 
may or may not have anything to do with how we actually made that choice. 
We are quite confident that the above description of the process of intuiting holds, but we 
could not say that it is particularly detailed.  Although further empirical studies, particularly 
first-hand accounts of intuitors, may shed further light on some details, we must expect that 
we may never or for a long time have a good and detailed description of the process of 
intuiting.  However, good descriptions or models do not make for good intuition.  The 
expertise of the intuitor does. 
Features of intuition 
 ?/ŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶŝƐǁŚĂƚǇŽƵŬŶŽǁĨŽƌƐƵƌĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŬŶŽǁŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ? ?
Weston Agor 
What makes distinguishing intuitive from non-intuitive reasoning so difficult is that there is 
no one single characteristic along which this contrast can be made.  In this section, we provide 
a set of six characteristics.  These together can do the job: all six are necessary for identifying 
intuition, and if any one of them is missing, then it is something else (cf Dane & Pratt, 2007; 
Dörfler & Ackermann, 2012; Kahneman, 2003: 698; Sadler-Smith, 2008: 13).  Three of these 
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refer to the process of intuiting, and three to the outcome of this process we call intuition 
and have conceptualized earlier as intuitive knowledge. 
Intuiting is instantaneous or, at least, very-very fast.  In this respect, it is similar to guessing, 
however, it is guessing which is  “ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?(in line with Simon, 1983: 25).  This speed 
of intuiting is particularly important today, when the time pressure is constant.  As Handy 
(1995: 49) puts it  “ǇƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǇŽƵŬŶŽǁǁŚĞƌĞǇŽƵŽƵŐŚƚƚŽŐŽ ?ŝƚ ?ƐƚŽŽůĂƚĞƚŽŐŽƚŚĞƌĞ ? ? But 
how is intuiting so rapid?  According to Prietula and Simon (1989: 121-122), intuiting is a leap 
by which the expert bypasses the analytical steps and overcomes limitations of attention and 
of memory (both short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory (LTM)).  We become 
aware of the right answer before consciously realizing it by relying on our experience without 
having to analyze everything (Klein & Weick, 2000).  This pattern recognition that helps bypass 
the steps of deliberate reasoning are not limited to situations the decision maker already 
knows.  Expert decision makers will recognize patterns in new situations, not only in situations 
with which they are already familiar.  This means that we should understand the patterns as 
particulars that are integrated in the whole in the process of intuiting, and this whole may be 
something we see for the first time. 
Intuiting is spontaneous.  This means that intuiting does not require effort, at least at the 
moment when it happens (cf Agor, 1984: 75).  However, this also means that intuition cannot 
be produced at will (Isaack, 1978: 918).  This does not mean that the decision makers just 
need to lay back and wait for intuition to arrive; hard work is needed beforehand, and then 
the intuiting happens in this relaxed state (see e.g. Hadamard, 1954 for numerous examples).  
The work needed for good intuition is not limited to the work on the particular problem; it 
includes all the previous work in the discipline or in the problem area and has a strong link to 
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the level of expertise (Prietula & Simon, 1989).  This means that intuiting brings together 
everything we have experienced in our field in various contexts and can have bearing on the 
decision situation at hand (cf Rowan, 1986: 83).  In terms of the intuiting process, we could 
say that the intuitor can only integrate the particulars they have, and that involves all their 
knowledge in the discipline, in the problem area and about the context. 
Intuiting is alogical.  The terminology to describe this feature of intuiting is slightly different 
in every case: Kahneman and Tversky (1982: 124) describe it as  “ĂŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůĂŶĚƵŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚ
mode of reasoning, without the use of analytic methods or deůŝďĞƌĂƚĞĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?, Barnard 
(1938: 301 ff) calls ŝƚĂ ‘non-logical ? process to contrast it to the logical process of reasoning, 
etc.  However, the message is the same every time: intuiting operates independently of the 
general principles of reasoning that Russell (1946: 379) calls logic.  We call this mode of 
reasoning alogical, meaning that it neither follows (logical) nor contradicts (illogical) the rules 
of logic.  For similar reasons we can describe intuiting as arational, meaning that it is not 
rational or irrational, simply independent from the rules of rationality.  It is important to note 
that qualifying intuiting as alogical actually does not tell us anything about its modus 
operandi, we only know what it is not.  The question is whether we will ever discover some 
set of rules that intuition seems to follow.  We believe that it is likely that we will not, as the 
particulars are of very personal nature embracing apart from the accepted knowledge in the 
discipline and in the problem area also the subjective aspects of these as well as of the current 
context and also the personal history of the intuitor.  However, we agree with Simon (1987: 
61) that  “ ?ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚĂƚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ƌather, the two 
processes are essential complementary components of effeĐƚŝǀĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ? 
 13 
Intuition is gestalt Žƌ Ă  ?ŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐ ŚƵŶĐŚ (Beveridge, 1957: 73; Hayashi, 2001: 64; Miller & 
Ireland, 2005; Morris, 1967: 158; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005: 357).  This means two things.  
On ƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĂƚŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶŝƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ďŝŐƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ
the broad context, far reaching implications (and the implications of the implications, etc.) 
that are usually not considered in step-by-step reasoning, as the probabilities would be 
considered very low.  But it also takes into account ǁŚĂƚǁĞĐŽƵůĚĐĂůů ‘ŝŶǀŝƐŝďůĞƉĂƌƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ
are inaccessible to deliberate step-by-step reasoning, what is sometimes referred to as the 
unknown unknowns.  On the other hand, intuition also involves the totality of the intuitor.  
This view is also fully in harmony with how the Dreyfus brothers  ?ƐĞĞ ‘Expert intuition ?ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?
describe the highest level of expertise, i.e. that the totality of the situation is intuitively 
perceived and the response involves the complete personality in an intuitive response.  This 
does not mean, however, that intuition needs to be vague.  /ŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶŝƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ? ?it
means seeing the  ‘big picture ? as well as the relevant detail and being able to quickly switch 
between the two (Dörfler & Eden, 2014).  Thus the (expert) intuitor will be able to see which 
detail needs to be changed as well as how this will affect the big picture. 
Intuition is tacit.  Hayashi (2001: 60) asserts, based on numerous interviews, that top 
ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐ ĐĂŶŶŽƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŶŐŵƵĐŚďĞǇŽŶĚ ůĂďĞůůŝŶŐ ŝƚ  “ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ? ? “ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? “ŐƵƚŝŶƐƚŝŶĐƚ ? ? “ŝŶŶĞƌǀŽŝĐĞ ? ? ƌ “ŚƵŶĐŚ ? ? Dane and Pratt (2007: 36) 
therefore characterize intuition as nonconscious, meaning that the outcomes of intuiting are 
accessible to conscious thinking but how one arrives at them is not.  On the one hand, this 
seems sensible based on how we described the process of intuiting in the previous section.  
On the other hand, tacitness is very difficult to accept for the schooled mind, as our schools 
educate us to require sound reasoning or even proof for our choices.  However, this is only as 
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we are focusing on the wrong side of the schooling when we think about decision making, on 
the mathematical mind.  In arts, if we paint a picture or write a poem, we are not required to 
provide a justification why we see things a particular way.  ^ŽǁĞĂƌĞďĂĐŬƚŽĂƌŶĂƌĚ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚ
ŽĨƚĂůŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĂƌƚƐ ? ? If want to make use of our intuition, we have to accept 
that it is tacit.  This, however, does not mean that we cannot provide a non-intuitive 
justification that explains why the intuitive judgement makes sense, only we need to know 
that this explanation is likely not how we arrived at the intuitive judgment  W and that we will 
never know how we arrived at it.  Thus we can say that the tacit nature of intuition is an 
additional reason why we need intuition and non-intuition to work in cycles. 
Intuitors are confident about their intuitions.  The explanations discussed under the previous 
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƚŽŵĂŬĞŽƚŚĞƌƐĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞŝŶƚƵŝƚŽƌ ?ƐũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ W the intuitors usually do not 
need justification.  Jung (1921: §770) distinguished four psychological functions: thinking, 
feeling, sensation, and intuition.  ,Ğ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ  “ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞƐ ĂŶ
ŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂŶĚĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? This certainty is one of the most commonly described 
features of intuition emphasized by both decision makers and great scientists.  One of the 
most often quoted exaŵƉůĞƐ ŝƐ WŽŝŶĐĂƌĠ ?Ɛ ƐƚŽƌǇ(e.g. Damasio, 1994; Goldberg, 1983b; 
Hadamard, 1954; Polányi & Prosch, 1977; Vaughan, 1979); probably because it is striking that 
ŚŝƐŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ‘ƚŽůĚŚŝŵ ?ƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞŽĨǁŚĂƚŚĞǁas trying to prove previously and later he 
proved this opposite.  It is important to note that the built-in feeling of certainty of intuitive 
knowledge does not mean that intuition is infallible.  Sadler-Smith (2008: 28) quotes critiques 
ŽĨŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ŝntuition is somĞƚŝŵĞƐǁƌŽŶŐďƵƚŶĞǀĞƌŝŶĚŽƵďƚ ? ? Nobody claims 
that non-intuitive reasoning always gets it right.  We also must not expect this from intuition.  
However, when it is the non-intuitive reasoning that fails us, this is easier to accept, as we 
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simply did some steps, these can be checked afterwards, and it is relatively easy to blame the 
failure to something external.  ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝĨŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚĂĐŝƚĂŶĚǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞƚŽ
ŐŽŽŶƚŚĂŶƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘/ƌĞĂůůǇĨĞĞůĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ/ ĂŵƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶǁĞĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚǁĞĚŝĚŶŽƚ
get it right, we can only blame ourselves.  Not to mention that others will blame us as well.  
However, if we also know that intuition is not infallible, we have a good starting point for our 
intuitive endeavors. 
There are two further things that are sometimes mentioned as features of intuition/intuiting.  
The first is the somatic effects, the second is the affective charges.  Bodily feelings (somatic 
effects) are often associated with intuition as this seems to be part of the language of how 
our intuitions speak to us.  EǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ŐƵƚĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ? ? ‘ďƵƚƚĞƌĨůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƐ ŽŵĂĐŚ ?ĂŶĚ
similar are not simply metaphors, many intuitors have their particular somatic effects tell 
them that they have arrived at an intuitive judgment.  We do not consider the somatic effects 
as features of intuition as there seem to be a great variety and they do not seem to be a 
necessary aspect of intuition and non-intuitive judgments may also be accompanied with 
somatic effects.  We can also hear that intuitions to be accompanied with emotional effects.  
Decision makers often seem to be in love with their intuitive judgments.  Most authors, 
however, are very cautious about the affective charges, and usually we can read that 
ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ ‘ŽĨƚĞŶĂĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĐŚĂƌŐĞĚ ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŵĂǇŶŽt always be the case.  We 
will probably learn more about this, considering that intuition research is still in its infancy.  
However, we have also seen decision makers being in love with their statistics tables, 
feasibility studies and pie charts.  Therefore, we do not consider emotions to be a necessary 
feature of intuition, but it we notice emotions we are more likely to expect intuition. 
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Enhancing intuition 
 ?[ ?] the methods of scientific inquiry cannot be explicitly formulated and hence can be 
transmitteĚŽŶůǇŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇƐĂƐĂŶĂƌƚ ?ďǇƚŚĞĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉƉƌĞŶƚŝĐĞƐƚŽĂŵĂƐƚĞƌ ? ?
Michael Polányi 
From what we have said so far about intuition, we believe there is no doubt left about the 
importance of intuition for expert decision takers.  However, based on the process and 
features of intuition, it does not seem straightforward how one can become better at 
intuiting.  As we have shown both that at high level of expertise intuition becomes the 
dominant mode of knowing as well as for reliable intuition is only available at high level of 
expertise, it is probably clear that becoming more knowledgeable in the particular knowledge 
domain helps in bettering intuition.  We could consider this to be a generic way of enhancing 
intuition.  The second group would include direct ways of enhancing intuition, meaning that 
these ways focus on directly making intuition better.  These direct ways often involve various 
mental exercises that the intuitors can perform themselves or in groups with or without 
supervision.  There is, however, one direct way of enhancing intuition that stands out: the 
master-apprentice relationship.  The third group of intuition enhancement ways we call 
indirect ways, as their focus in not on intuition itself but something that relates to or interacts 
with intuition, namely the context of the intuitor, the awareness of intuition and the action 
taken based on intuition.  In this section, we do not engage in the generic way, as that could 
include everything that we know about learning.  We also do not tackle most of the direct 
ways as the academic basis of these are not particularly elaborate.  The exception is the 
master-apprentice relationship, which we briefly describe, as it stands out both in its 
significance as well as how much we know about it.  We also provide brief description of the 
indirect ways. 
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The master-apprentice relationship is a widely accepted mode of achieving the highest level 
of expertise, and we have explored it at length elsewhere.  (Baracskai, Dörfler & Velencei, 
2005; Dörfler & Eden, 2014; Dörfler & Stierand, 2009; Stierand, 2015)  We have argued that 
it seems to be the only known way of passing on tacit knowledge and thus the only direct way 
of learning intuition from someone else.  The essence of the master apprentice relationship 
ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ǁƌŽŶŐ ďŽƚŚ ƚŽ ĨŽůůŽǁ ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ĂďĂŶĚŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁĂǇ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚŝƐ
struggle, a new master emerges.  What happens in regarding intuition is best expressed by 
Polányi (1966a: 14):   ?ŶŽǀŝĐĞ ?ƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŬŝůůŽĨĂŵĂƐƚĞƌ ?ǁŝůůƐĞĞŬŵĞŶƚĂůůǇ
ƚŽĐŽŵďŝŶĞŚŝƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŵĂƐƚĞƌĐŽŵďŝŶĞƐƚŚĞŵƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ? ? So 
the apprentice is watching the master using her/his intuition, perhaps ask questions about it 
and then apply what Polányi (1946) termed  ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? W which is imitation that is 
adapted to personality, context and problem.  Of course, the master provides feedback on 
ƚŚĞĂƉƉƌĞŶƚŝĐĞ ?ƐŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƉƉƌĞŶƚŝĐĞŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇĞǀŽůǀĞƐŝŶƚŽĂŵĂƐƚĞƌ ? 
Creating an intuition-friendly environment.  It is often emphasized in the literature as well as 
in personal communication with intuitive people we have talked to that they need to hide the 
intuitive origins of their achievements and provide a post-rationalized well-structured 
argument instead.  Such environments discourage the use of intuition.  Therefore, creating 
intuition-friendly environments at personal, interpersonal and organizational levels can make 
a great deal of difference.  At a personal level, this means putting our minds in a state where 
it is more open to intuition and accepting intuition.  For example, it is well documented that 
reading poetry, enjoying art, music or extreme sports, sitting in the woods or consuming 
 ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĨŽŽĚ ? (Agor, 1984: 75) can help liberating ƚŚĞŵŝŶĚĨƌŽŵ ‘uninspiring ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ
and may foster intuitive and creative ways of thinking.  The interpersonal context means 
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people who accept intuition as a valid form of knowledge and can discuss it with the intuitor.  
Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2007), for instance, emphasize the importance of promoting the 
development of intuition through feedback.  Finally, in an intuition-friendly organizational 
context it is acceptable to admit for using intuition  W which does not mean that an argument 
does not need to be provided to substantiate the intuitive judgement.  However, those who 
proved themselves as good intuitors may gradually enjoy benefits of providing the argument 
later or not at all.  This is particularly important for organizations in turbulent environment, 
when the response time is of crucial importance. 
Increasing awareness of intuition.  Experienced intuitors are usually very good recognizing 
and interpreting their intuitions.  However, those who just start relying on their intuitions, 
often fail to notice or find it difficult to distinguish intuition from other phenomena, including 
hopes and fears, that may have similar somatic and affective characteristics.  Knowing our 
bodies and emotions is very important in this sense.  On personal level self-observation, 
reflection and keeping diaries can help (Cartwright, 2004; Goldberg, 1983a: 193-194; 
Vaughan, 1979: 205).  At an interpersonal level discussing intuitive experiences with peers 
and persons of trust can be helpful (e.g. Agor, 1984: 66).  At organizational level, we can only 
be supportive of the use as well as development of intuition; not only in terms of the above 
noted techniques but also by supporting master-apprentice relationships. 
Acting upon intuition.  Creating a supportive environment is likely to help intuition occur, 
better awareness will help to notice and understand intuitive leaps, but then we also need to 
act upon intuition.  When the intuition happens, should not delay the action, think it through 
again, check by means of structured step-by-step reasoning  ‘ũƵƐƚ ŝŶ ĐĂƐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ĨŽƌƚŚ.  If 
intuition is not followed by action, we will never really know whether it has worked in the first 
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place.  There are no techniques suggested explicitly for improving how we can act upon 
intuition but many of the previously mentioned techniques also support action.  Reflecting 
helps learning from previous actions and poetry, art, philosophy may help achieving an 
actionable mindset.  Discussing it with peers provides examples as well as feedback.  An 
organizational environment that supports intuition also supports acting upon it; most 
importantly, it does not sanction severely when intuition led to bed outcome through action.  
Of course, intuition is not always right, and neither is the non-intuitive step-by-step reasoning.  
While we cannot allow poor outcomes all the time, in the case of non-intuitive step-by-step 
reasoning people are not usually penalized for a single failure  W intuitors should be treated 
the same. 
While it is clear that we cannot simply set up courses or read a couple of books to increase 
our intuition, we wanted to show that there is much that we can do to support the 
development of intuition.  A number of these things is not unique to intuition and not so alien 
to our culture, such as peer discussions, reflection and reflexivity, the master-apprentice 
relationship, etc.  We make huge efforts to improve our non-intuitive step-by-step reasoning 
capabilities  W if we do as much for intuition, it should be sufficient. 
So is intuition mystical? 
 ?I propose that the goal of science is to make the wonderful and the complex 
understandable and simple  W ďƵƚŶŽƚůĞƐƐǁŽŶĚĞƌĨƵů ? ?
Herbert Simon 
Having gone through the process of polishing the initial picture about intuition from various 
perspectives, we are back to the initial question:  Is intuition mystical or not?  Lieberman 
(2000: 109) suggests that intuition is at best regarded as mysterious and unexplainable.  To 
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the contrary, Davenport and Prusak (2000: 11), argue:   “tĞĂƌƌŝǀĞĂƚĂŶĂŶƐǁĞƌŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞůǇ ?
without knowing how we got there.  That does not mean the steps to not exist  W intuition is 
not mystical.  It means we have so thoroughly learned the steps that they happen 
automatically, without conscious thought, and therefore at great speed. ? 
Our answer is somewhere in-between these two.  We believe that it is useful to try to 
understand intuition in the academic sense of the word.  However, as intuiting happens 
almost instantaneously and intuition is tacit, there is a limit to this.  We agree with Isaack 
(1978: 919) that  ?ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚĐĂŶŶŽƚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůƚŽŽůƐ ?
preconceived categories, and symbols used by the intellect only represent reality and are not 
ƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?.  However, this should not stop us in trying to understand intuition.  
But we need intuition to make sense of intuition. 
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